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Shielding Google’s language toxicity model
against adversarial attacks
Nestor Rodriguez⋆ Sergio Rojas–Galeano⋆⋆
Abstract
Background. Lack of moderation in online communities enables par-
ticipants to incur in personal aggression, harassment or cyberbullying,
issues that have been accentuated by extremist radicalisation in the
contemporary post-truth politics scenario. This kind of hostility is
usually expressed by means of toxic language, profanity or abusive
statements. Recently Google has developed a machine-learning-based
toxicity model in an attempt to assess the hostility of a comment; un-
fortunately, it has been suggested that said model can be deceived by
adversarial attacks that manipulate the text sequence of the comment.
Methods/Results. In this paper we firstly characterise such adver-
sarial attacks as using obfuscation and polarity transformations. The
former deceives by corrupting toxic trigger content with typographic
edits, whereas the latter deceives by grammatical negation of the toxic
content. Then, we propose a two–stage approach to counter–attack
these anomalies, bulding upon a recently proposed text deobfuscation
method and the toxicity scoring model. Lastly, we conducted an ex-
periment with approximately 24000 distorted comments, showing how
in this way it is feasible to restore toxicity of the adversarial variants,
while incurring roughly on a twofold increase in processing time.
Conclusions. Even though novel adversary challenges would keep
coming up derived from the versatile nature of written language, we
anticipate that techniques combining machine learning and text pat-
tern recognition methods, each one targeting different layers of lin-
guistic features, would be needed to achieve robust detection of toxic
language, thus fostering aggression–free digital interaction.
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1 Introduction
Grecian agora was the public place where citizens in ancient times gathered
to debate current affairs and exercise rhetoric as a way to persuade audi-
ences to follow a proposal for action. Nowadays digital media such as social
networks platforms, originally conceived as simple virtual cork boards to ex-
change information among friends, have evolved to become contemporary
agoras, where any person with an Internet–connected device may express
their opinions and debate them openly and freely.
Unfortunately, not only the medium but also the discourse have changed,
and rhetoric arguments are now frequently based on emotion rather than
reason, yielding discussions intended to ridicule, distort or confuse other’s
opinion, avoiding factual–based debate in favour of opinion manipulation by
means of fake news, libel and personal or social group hostility, an scenario
now commonly–referred as post–truth politics [4].
Emotion–guided arguments may lead easily to radicalism in political, reli-
gious, ethnic, sport or minorities views, which in turn may result in comments
coloured with personal aggression, harassment or cyberbullying [7, 3, 12].
This kind of hostility is becoming a cause of concern in online communities;
hence, automatic moderation tools are needed to prevent caustic behaviour
within the steadily increasing massive amounts of daily discussions gener-
ated in social media. In this direction, Google Counter-Abuse Technology
Team has launched Perspective, a tool to identify toxicity of a written com-
ment based on crowd–sourcing and machine learning models trained on large
datasets of toxic conversations, as an attempt to provide safer places for
online discussions [17].
Despite the remarkable efficacy of this tool to identify high–calibre lan-
guage in diverse hot topics such as US Presidential election, Brexit and cli-
mate change, it has been suggested recently that its detection mechanism
can be heavily defeated using adversarial strategies that corrupt the input
text sequence with typographic or polarity manipulation, to such a degree
that becomes unrecognisable to the trained model but remains readable by
the human eye. For example, Hosseini et al. [6] has shown that the insult-
ing statement “They are liberal idiots who are uneducated” (toxicity: 90%),
becomes a mild comment when written as “They are liberal i.diots who are
un.educated” (toxicity: 15%). Similarly, the rude sentence “It’s stupid and
wrong” (toxicity: 89%), remains rude even if negated: “It’s not stupid and
wrong” (toxicity: 83%). Since the space of possible sequence variations ob-
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tainable with these kind of attacks is combinatorial, it would not be feasible
to train a model even with large amounts of available examples.
In this paper a counter–attack strategy is devised; it consists of firstly pre–
processing the input with a recently proposed text deobfuscation method [14]
so as to transform it back into its original representation, and subsequently
feeding this corrected text to the toxic scoring model. Our results indicate
that this approach is able to effectively restore the intended toxic score of the
corrupted text given by Perspective, contributing so to shield Google toxicity
model against these sort of adversarial attacks.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Google toxicity model
The Google Perspective (GP) model aims to score toxicity of harassment
comments in online platforms on a scale from 0 (“healthy”) to 1 (“very
toxic”) . The model was built based on large–scale datasets of abusive com-
ments, using crowd–sourced annotations to train machine learning classifiers
(logistic regression and neural networks, with bag–of–words features, see [17]
for details). Toxic content is defined as “rude, disrespectful, or unreasonable
comment that is likely to make you leave a discussion” [1].
2.2 Adversarial attacks
Within the machine learning community, an adversarial framework refers
to inputs deliberately designed to manipulate the expected behaviour of a
prediction model [9, 15]. The adversary usually picks data from distribu-
tions different to those assumed when training the model, thus defeating its
prediction capabilities. The attacks usually consist of corrupted features or
distorted inputs. In our problem of interest, two adversarial attacks on the
GP toxic model have been recently suggested [6], which we formally charac-
terise as follows.
Obfuscation attack. In this attack the adversary modifies the character
sequence of those words conveying most of the toxic content within the input
comment. The modification takes advantage of the robustness of the human
visual system to recognise corrupted variants of text. Such edits can be:
misspellings or symbol substitution, letter repetition, fake punctuation (in-
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serting dots, commas or blanks within letters in the words). As a result, the
input text becomes disguised from its original character codification. These
kind of obfuscations has been identified as homoglyph substitution and bo-
gus segmentation anomalies [14]. Using these stratagems, attacks have been
reported to effectively reduce the toxicity score of an aggressive comment
down to a benign level [6].
Polarity attack. In this attack the adversary attempts to obtain high
toxicities for inoffensive comments that however exhibit profanity content.
This is achieved by simply negating toxic terms that effectively swaps the
polarity of the comment to its opposite meaning or emotional intent. For
example, if the toxic word is an adjective, the polarity change is achieved
by inserting the particle “not” before the word. The modified comment still
contains the character sequence of the toxic term, misleading the model to
identify it as aggressive even though its deceiving neutrality may originate
from idiomatically uncommon or odd–looking sentences. This kind of vul-
nerability was also exploited effectively in [6] to outwit the toxic model. We
remark that the adversarial intensity can be worsen by combining the two
attacks within the same input, i.e. negating obfuscated versions of toxicity
terms.
2.3 Dataset preparation
The GP website [1] provides a sample of comments gathered from online
surveys on three delicate topics: US Election (45 comments), Brexit (61)
and Climate change (49). The comments’ text along with scores obtained
with the GP toxicity model are given. So we collected those with toxic-
ity scores higher than 60%, obtaining a subset of 24 comments that were
labeled as {usel01,. . . , usel10, brex01,. . . , brex07, clic01,. . . , clic07}.
The complete list of comments is provided as supplementary information
(Appendix A. Original comments).
We subsequently prepared datasets conveying the two types of adversar-
ial anomalies, namely obfuscation attack and polarity attack. In the first
attack, 1000 variations of each comment were randomly generated by iso-
lating the toxic terms of the comment in order to obfuscate them with a
number of edits including homoglyph substitution, bogus segmentation and
letter repetition (using the same scheme as [14]). The number of edits ap-
plied to each term was controlled with a corruption rate p ∈ {50%, 99%}.
Thus, for each character in the term a uniformly-distributed random number
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Table 1. An excerpt of adversarial examples from the datasets.
Topic Attack ID Text sequence
None (original) usel01 If they voted for Hilary they are idiots
US obfuscation-50 usel01-098 If they voted for Hilary they are !d10ts
Election obfuscation-99 usel01-295 If they voted for Hilary they are i;;d-I0t 5
polarity usel01’ If they voted for Hilary they are NOT idiots
Brexit
None (original) brex03 They are stupid and ignorant with no class
obfuscation-50 brex03-381 They are st.VPId and ignor@Nt with no class
obfuscation-99 brex03-120 They are s7uuupi-d,, and 1g,Nooooora,n t with no class
polarity brex03’ They are NOT stupid and NOT ignorant with no class
None (original) clic01 They have their heads up their ass
Climate obfuscation-50 clic01-688 They have their heads up their AS5
change obfuscation-99 clic01-512 They have their heads up their a**$s
polarity clic01’ They have their heads NOT up their ass.
r ∼ U(0, 1) was sampled; if r < p the character was kept unchanged, other-
wise one of these edits was applied (with their respective probabilities): an
homoglyph substitution (60%), a bogus segmentation (30%) or a fake letter
repetition (10%). In this way, we obtained two datasets, obfuscation-50
and obfuscation-99 consisting of 24,000 obfuscated toxic comments each
(see examples in Table 1). With respect to the homoglyph edits utilised in
the obfuscation attack, we defined substitution lists encompassing a subset
of the ASCII encoding set, as depicted in Fig. 1. We note in passing that
these lists can be customised to further include additional homoglyphs from
extended character encodings (e.g. letters with diacritical marks).
Now, the second dataset (polarity) was obtained by inserting negation
predicates within each comment. Thus, the size of this dataset is 24 negated
comments. Although possible, we refrained from generating obfuscated vari-
ants of these comments as the aim of this attack was to investigate the effect
of the polarity change achieved by the negated predicates alone. Table 1 also
shows examples for this attack. The complete datasets are provided as sup-
plementary files (see Appendix B. Datasets and experiment source code).
On the other hand, the list of toxic terms was build as follows. For
each comment in the original dataset, we scanned every single word with
the toxicity model; those scoring higher than 50% were added to the list.
Regarding the negated predicates, such list was built by preceding each word
within the toxic term list, with the particle not if it was an adjective or noun,
or do not if it was a verb. The resulting lists are shown in Table 2.
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Figure 1. Homoglyph substitution lists. Each list is indexed by the char-
acters shown in the inner orange ring, corresponding to the letters of the
English alphabet. The sets of their corresponding homoglyphs used in this
study are shown in the outer blue ring. The blank character “ ” indexes the
lists of bogus segmentators.
Table 2. The lists of toxic terms and their negated predicates.
Toxic term Negated predicate Toxic term Negated predicate
idiots not idiots awful not awful
stupid not stupid in hell not in hell
the worst not the worst morons not morons
screw you don’t screw you terrible not terrible
suck don’t suck a shame not a shame
stupidity no stupidity racist not racist
sexist not sexist supremacists not supremacists
assholes not assholes ignorant not ignorant
a moron not a moron nationalists not nationalists
rubbish not rubbish up their ass not up their ass
uneducated not uneducated an idiot not an idiot
an abortion not an abortion
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2.4 Disarming the adversarial attacks
The method we propose to address the adversarial attacks is illustrated in
Fig. 2; it basically consist of filtering the corrupted comment prior to feeding
the toxicity model, by means of the deobfuscation approach introduced in
[14]. Such normalisation filter requires a list of target vocables written in
plain English, that are to be searched within the input text. The approach
then uses an approximate string matching algorithm to find occurrences of
the vocables, either verbatim copies or variants resulting from the homo-
glyph substitution, bogus segmentation or symbol repetition. Matching oc-
currences are corrected and the resulting sequence is accordingly fed to the
GP toxicity model.
We defined two correction schemes, namely a deobfuscation filter or a
neutralisation filter, depending on the kind of attack, obfuscation or polar-
ity, respectively. In the former, the vocabulary consists of a list of toxic
Adversary
Deobfuscate
filter
obfuscated
text
Toxicity
model
Toxic
terms list
normalised
text
score
(a)
Adversary
Neutralise
filter
negated
text
Toxicity
model
Negated
predicates list
pruned
text
score
(b)
Figure 2. Disarming the adversarial attacks. The adversary comment is
preprocessed in order to provide a suitable input to the toxicity model. (a)
Obfuscation attack: the preprocessor is a deobfuscation filter fed with a list
of toxic terms; if any obfuscated variant is found, the filter replaces them
with their plain English version. (b) Polarity attack: the preprocessor is a
neutralisation filter fed with a list of negation predicates; if any of these are
found, in this case the filter removes them from the input text.
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terms that when obfuscated are not recognised by the model, thus lowering
the toxicity of the comment whilst still conveying its aggressive tone; there-
fore here the filter corrects the input by replacing obfuscated occurrences
with their corresponding plain English versions. In contrast, the neutralisa-
tion filter uses as vocabulary a list of negated predicates of such toxic terms;
here the input is corrected by removing (i.e. pruning) plain or even obfus-
cated occurrences of these predicates, effectively switching the polarity of the
comment towards a neutral attitude by expurgating references to (negated)
toxic content. These two vocabularies are shown in Table 2.
3 Results
3.1 Experimental setup
In order to apply the toxicity model and the deobfuscation filter we used
the Perspective Web API [1] and the TextPatrol Web API [2] respectively.
For this purpose we developed a command-line tool that takes as input a
dataset of comments that are processed by invoking the APIs in order to
produce an output text file including, for each comment, toxicity scores and
execution times of the GP model alone and the combined TP+GP method.
The command-line tool was written using the Go programming language,
it is open source and publicly available in the following Gitlab repository
https://gitlab.com/textpatrol/gp-tp-experiment, which also hosts the
obfuscation and polarity attacks datasets, the set of result files and instruc-
tions on how to build the tool and re-run the experiments.
3.2 Obfuscation attack
Let us examine first the results of toxicity scores reported in Fig. 3. The
figure comprises three plots corresponding to the three topics: usel*, brex*
and clic*. Each plot in turn combines the scores obtained in both datasets,
obfuscation-50 and obfuscation-99, within two reflected panels (upper
and lower half, respectively; notice that the y-axis scale ranges from 0 to 1 in
both directions). Three sets of values are depicted in these plots: toxicity of
the original comments (red squares) and average toxicities of the 1000 vari-
ants of each comment, as obtained by the GP model (green bars) and by the
proposed TP+GP method (amber bars, whiskers being standard deviations).
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Figure 3. Toxicity scores for the obfuscation attack. In each plot the upper
half panel shows average toxicities obtained for comments obfuscated with a
50% corruption rate (obfuscation-50 dataset) whereas the reflected lower
half panel reports toxicities with a 99% corruption rate (obfuscation-99
dataset). Bars indicate the average was taken over 1000 variants in their
respective comment category (whiskers being standard deviations) whilst
squares indicate the toxicity values of a single observation, i.e. those of
the original comments. (a) US Election. (b) Brexit. (c) Climate change.
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We initially note that the toxicity of the original deobfuscated comments
(red squares) is nearly 1.0 for every comment, except usel09 and usel10
scoring toxicities closer to 0.9. These two categories contain toxic terms
related to superlatives or adjective derivations (racist, supremacist, sexist,
stupidity) whereas the remainder comments incorporate either insults or ob-
scenity (idiot, stupid, asshole, moron, screw you) suggesting that the GP
toxic model stresses profanity terms.
Next, we identify a common pattern on the results obtained by the GP
model alone, namely its vulnerability to the obfuscation attack. This is no
matter of surprise as this weakness in the model was previously suggested
in the preliminary study of [6] using a few examples of the attack. Here it
can be seen that in average, the GP model (green bars) decreases toxicities
to levels closer to or lower than 0.5, which can be considered a moderate
aggressiveness cut–off to decide if a comment is safe (18 out of 24 cases are
below this cut–off in obfuscation-50 and 22/24 in obfuscation-99). A
more stringent cut–off of 0.75 would have resulted in all but one of the toxic
obfuscated categories been scored as non–toxic. Altogether, these findings
substantiate on a large–scale basis that the adversarial obfuscation attack is
effectively able to deceive the GP model.
On the other hand, we observe that in average the TP+GP method (am-
ber bars) manages to restore the toxic scores close to their original values.
On the obfuscation-50 dataset the differences between the TP+GP scores
and the original toxicity differ in less than 0.03 in all but three cases: brex01
(0.11), brex07 (0.11) and clic07 (0.15). Similarly, on the more deceitful
obfuscation-99 dataset, where essentially the entire sequence of toxic terms
occurrences are obfuscated, the reduction in the scores is again less than 0.03
in all but four cases: usel09 (0.05), brex01 (0.21), brex07 (0.22) and clic07
(0.26). Notice that even with a stringent 0.7 cut–off, the proposed method
in average will correctly identify all the cases as toxic. Besides, the evidence
indicate that also in all cases, the average drop of toxicity incurred by the
GP model is significantly larger than that the average drop obtained by the
TP+GP method (p < 0.001).
In order to further compare the effectiveness of the proposed method in
disarming the obfuscation attack, we illustrate in Fig. 4 radial frequency
histograms of the proportion of obfuscated instances correctly scored with at
least the original toxicity, from the total 1000 comments (red area) in each
category. It can be seen how on the obfuscation-50 dataset the TP+GP
method (amber area) is able to correctly score a large proportion of comments
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Figure 4. Effectiveness in disarming the obfuscation attack. These radial
histograms show the proportion of obfuscated comments correctly scored
with at least the same toxicity of the original comment, out of 1000 vari-
ants (red area), as obtained by GP model (green sector) and TP+GP
method (amber sector). (a) On the obfuscation-50 dataset. (b) On the
obfuscation-99 dataset.
in all topics. This pattern is replicated in the obfuscation-99 dataset,
although proportions slightly decline due to the higher corruption level, which
yields more acid attacks.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that on the obfuscation-50 dataset
the GP model (left panel, green area) is able to recognise and score correctly
a small proportion of the variants, particularly in the usel06, brex05 and
clic01 categories. On further examination we found that the toxicity of
the two former comes from the use of the insulting vocable “moron” (see
Appendix A. Original comments). Now notice that the homoglyphs defined
for this particular combination of letters were simply their upper– and lower-
case versions (see Fig.1); thus, given a low corruption rate it is very likely that
no segmentators are inserted and therefore some of the generated variants
would consist of the same text spelled with intermixed case (e.g. “mORoN ”,
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“MoROn”, etc). In such instances, the attack can be easily disarmed by a
simple case–converting operation which we assume the GP API is carrying
out before feeding the comment to the model.
Regarding the recognition ability of the clic01 variants category by the
GP Model, a closer inspection shows that its toxicity is originated from using
the term “ass” in its offensive meaning (see Appendix A. Original comments);
although in this case homoglyphs for these combination of letters include
non-letter symbols (see Fig.1), we observe that because of the short length
of the offensive term (3 character-long) along with the low corruption rate
(50%) it is very likely that a number of generated variants are identical to
the original or a mixed-case version as before. On the other hand, in the
more acid obfuscation-99 attacks (right panel) harder obfuscated variants
will be found more frequently, hence the dilution of the green bars.
Moreover, we observe that the longer the toxic sequence and the more
toxic terms are included in the original comment, the stronger the deception
effect of the obfuscation attack. Take for example usel10 which contains 3
toxic terms, one of which is 12-letters long (see Appendix A. Original comments);
in this case, the proportion of recognised variants by the GP model is tiny.
Combine that with more frequent bogus segmentations due to higher corrup-
tion rates, resulting in the toxic recognition ability of the GP model to further
weaken1, as it is noticeable in the radial histogram of the obfuscation-99
dataset. The TP+GP approach in contrast, is able to still recognise most of
them despite the intensity of the attack.
Let us focus now on processing time. Fig. 5 shows average runtimes of
the 1000 repetitions for GP model and TP+GP method in each category.
The first observation here is that the effectiveness of the proposed method
in disarming the obfuscation attack, comes at the expense of an increase
in runtime. This is due of course to the additional preprocessing step that
executes the deobfuscation filter. The trend in the plot is that the TP+GP
nearly doubles the time taken by GP model alone.
The second observation is that the average runtimes for each comment
category are quite similar in both obfuscation-50 and obfuscation-99, a
reasonable behaviour considering that the computational complexity of the
1Although it is well-worth noting that GP keeps refining its model by continuously
learning from more examples, thus fortifying toxic scores appropriately. In fact, the
toxicities recorded when this study began, soared up during the following months (see
Appendix C. GP Model toxicity update). Here we report updated scores at the time of
submission.
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Figure 5. Average runtimes for the obfuscation attack experiment, GP
model (green) vs. TP+GP method (amber). (a) obfuscation-50. (b)
obfuscation-99.
deobfuscation method depends only on the length of the text [14]. Since the
obfuscation attack may add extra characters (bogus segmentators or fake
letter repetitions) only to the toxic terms within the comment, the total
text length may vary but not drastically. Hence, the resemblance of average
runtimes patterns exhibited in both datasets.
The last observation is related to the variability of the results, indicated
by the whiskers in the plots. At first glance these deviations may seem large;
nonetheless recall that the experimental pipeline was built using two web-
service APIs, one for GP and another one for TP, respectively. In such setting
the execution of the experiments need to take into account network latencies
and server availability, which are less certain than having a dedicated host
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running the scripts2. Besides, since in our experimental setup the TP+GP
method is actually invoking two independent web services, it is more likely
to suffer further delays that affect its runtime variability.
3.3 Polarity attack
The results of the polarity attack experiment are summarised in Fig. 6,
were toxicities for the original comments and the negated variants using
both GP and TP+GP are shown; recall that the polarity dataset contains
a single negated variation per comment, hence the figure reports a single
run per category ({usel01’,...,clic07’}). These scores indicate that this
attack also manages to deceive the GP model, because the negated versions
were assigned high toxicities (although lower than their respective original
comments). When using the TP+GP method on the contrary, the toxicities
fall to levels mostly below 0.5, except for some comments that incidentally
contain toxic content not initially identified as such at the beginning of our
study, but incorporated into newer versions of the GP model (e.g. terms like
“dishonest” in usel04 or “short-sighted” in clic06, that do not appear in
the vocabulary lists of Fig. 2).
The rationale of this behaviour is that the toxicity model is trained on
the assumption that the comments would be coherently written, in a gram-
matical sense. Thus it simply checks weather toxicity features and patterns
are identified within the comment and not if it is correctly constructed. To
illustrate this point, let us analyse the effect of the neutralise filter on com-
ment usel01’: If they voted for Hilary they are NOT idiots. Using GP, this
comment scores a 86% toxicity score (very close to the score of the original
aggressive comment), which when removing the negated offensive term (If
they voted for Hilary they are ) plunges to a 25% toxicity level; in other
words, GP would identify the trimmed sentence as healthy, despite its dubi-
ous grammar soundness.
The TP+GP approach takes advantage of the aforementioned assump-
tion, by simply removing subsequences matching the list of negated predi-
cates. One may argue however, that the trimmed comment is not comparable
with the negated one, as the former may become a grammatically malformed
sentence (due to the removed predicates). The reason we proceeded that
2In some cases the GP web service replied with a 400 Bad Request or 502 Bad Gate-
way error codes; these cases were excluded from the reported average runtimes (651 in
obfuscation-50 and 506 in obfuscation-99 out of their corresponding 24,000 variants).
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Figure 6. Toxicity scores for the polarity attack, as obtained by GP model
(green) vs. TP+GP method (amber) in the 24 negated comments of the
polarity dataset. Toxicities of the original comments are also shown (red).
way is we wanted to preserve as far as possible the authentic source content,
allowing the filter to remove but not to alter or add new content ad libi-
tum. An alternative approach would have been precisely to replace, instead
of to remove, the matching negated predicates with non–negated synonyms
(e.g. not awful → wonderful, not idiot → clever); as a result, correctly
constructed toxic–trigger–free comments would have been obtained. Hence,
their scores would also have dropped down to the healthiness region (in this
example If they voted for Hilary they are clever, obtained a 24% toxicity,
almost equalling the trimmed sentence).
As a closing remark, runtimes of this experiment resembled those of the
obfuscation attack in the sense that TP+GP nearly doubled GP processing
time (data not shown).
4 Conclusion
Machine learning models of language toxicity such as the GP engine, are ef-
fectively able to estimate aggressiveness in written comments. Nonetheless,
these models can be deceived by adversarial manipulation of the text, mis-
using the linguistic assumptions on which they are trained. Firstly at the
character–level, an adversary may take advantage of the versatility of writ-
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ten text along with the robust reconstruction capacity of the human brain,
to replace similar graphemes and/or to insert fake segmentations yielding
toxic contents unrecognisable to the model, thus increasing its false negative
rate. Secondly, at the sentence level, an adversary may deceive the model
using grammatical operations as simple as negations, switching the polarity
of the comment but keeping a structure similar to previously learned toxic
examples, hence, increasing the model false positive rate.
These attacks can be alleviated by preprocessing the comment so as to
restore its standard sequence and/or polarity representation before feeding
the toxic model. In the first kind of attack, such an approach can be ef-
fective even if half the length of the toxic sequence is obfuscated; higher
corruption rates decrease to some extent its effectiveness, but then also the
deception attempt becomes futile since the obfuscation becomes illegible to
human readers. In the second kind of attack, by removing the negated toxic
predicates or replacing them with affirmative synonyms, the preprocessor is
able to restore the correct toxicity; however we anticipate further research is
required since negation is a complex grammatical category whose rules differ
amply between lexical elements such as verbs compared to adjectives, nouns
and other clauses.
Another avenue of future study may consider harder adversarial attacks
such as transposition or tandem–character obfuscations, that despite lo-
sing some of the visual deception factor still pose alluring challenges (e.g.,
fuck → fukc, SHIT → S|-|IT). Besides, computational speedups in the ex-
ecution of the filters are also of practical interest (see [10] or more recently,
[11]), considering that language is an entity in constant evolution[5] whose
toxic vocabulary evolves likewise. Moreover, it would be feasible to extend
our adversarial toxic comments detection to other Latin–based languages by
training their respective word- or character-level n-grams machine learning
models [17] coupled with filters of obfuscation–prone customised vocabulary
[14]. Lastly, exploring feature spaces derived from conversational networks
[13] may improve the effectiveness of our methods.
As a final remark, we believe that ensuring aggression–free, respectful
and opinionated online discussions would require a pipeline of text processors
working on different levels of abstraction, ranging from sequence to linguistic
to semantic to sentiment analysis; lower level processing would provide useful
features to higher level analysis, which of course, may prove more difficult to
handle. To illustrate this point, take for example figures of speech such as
sarcasm, irony or satire that may use toxic content as a legitimate rhetorical
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device. In any case, aggression is strongly related to arising causes of concern
such as cyberbullying, harassment, post-truth opinion forming, pedophilia,
terrorism and mind state manipulation towards violence [16, 3, 8]; hence,
robust toxicity detection will have significant implications for casual, legal or
political issues in online communities.
Disclaimer: Original comments and modified variants, as depicted in Tables
1 and 3 and in other sections of this paper, were collected or derived from
their original source [1] for research purposes only; they do not represent the
views or opinions of the authors.
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Original comments
Table 3 shows the text sequences of the original toxic comments extracted
from the GP Website [1] with their toxicity scores at the beginning of this
study.
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Table 3. The list of original toxic comments extracted from [1].
ID Comment sequence Toxicity Length
usel01 If they voted for Hilary they are idiots 0.90 40
usel02 It was awful. People are stupid. 0.90 32
usel03 I respect it but they are stupid 0.89 32
usel04
Liberals are idiots. Why in the hell would u vote for a
person like Hillary Clinton. She believes in stealing, she’s
dishonest and believes it’s okay for an abortion to be done
at 9 months. She’s awful.
0.87 202
usel05
Donald trump is the worst person to be president. This
election really showed how stupid the U.S. is.
0.85 101
usel06 Anyone who voted for Trump is a moron. 0.81 38
usel07 Screw you trump supporters 0.79 26
usel08
It was a terrible. Both sides suck, but Trump REALLY
is scary
0.72 61
usel09
It is a shame that Donald Trump was elected. You can
never underestimate the stupidity of middle America.
0.67 105
usel10
Good job voting for a racist, sexist guy who’s putting
white supremacists in the white house. Have fun.
0.67 103
brex01 Anti democratic assholes 0.95 24
brex02 Ignorant and stupid 0.93 19
brex03 They are stupid and ignorant with no class 0.91 42
brex04 It’s stupid and wrong 0.89 21
brex05 you morons 0.92 10
brex06
idiots. backward thinking people. nationalists. not ac-
cepting facts. susceptible to lies.
0.80 89
brex07 It’s rubbish 0.69 12
clic01 They have their heads up their ass. 0.93 35
clic02 How can you be so stupid? 0.91 25
clic03 They are liberal idiots who are uneducated. 0.90 43
clic04
They’re stupid, it’s getting warmer, we should enjoy it
while it lasts.
0.86 71
clic05
Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re an idiot.
0.84 105
clic06 I think those people are stupid and short-sighted 0.84 49
clic07
They’re allowed to do that. But if they act like assholes
about, I will block them.
0.78 83
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Appendix B. Datasets and experiment source code
The obfuscation-50, obfuscation-99, and polarity datasets as well as
the Go language source code used in our experiments are publicly available at
the following Gitlab repository: https://gitlab.com/textpatrol/gp-tp-experiment.
Appendix C. GP Model toxicity update
Fig. 7 shows a comparative plot of the toxicity scores given by the GP
model at the beginning of the study (February, 2017) versus at the time of
submission (September, 2017). For the original comments it can be seen
that scores have raised, suggesting that the toxicity model has been refined
during this period, probably by learning from more examples and newer toxic
contents. On the contrary, the negated comments show a trend of decreasing
toxicities; we believe the model has been refined to account for additional
linguistic features related to the grammatical structures of negation, although
still it is being deceived by this attack to obtain scores higher than 50%.
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(a) Original: Sep. Feb. (b) Negated: Sep. Feb.
Figure 7. GP toxicity scores variation during the lasts months (Feb-
Sep/2017).
20
